The road to the Sustainable Development Goals: building global alliances and norms by Gasper, D.R. (Des)
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rjge20
Journal of Global Ethics
ISSN: 1744-9626 (Print) 1744-9634 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjge20
The road to the Sustainable Development Goals:
building global alliances and norms
Des Gasper
To cite this article: Des Gasper (2019) The road to the Sustainable Development
Goals: building global alliances and norms, Journal of Global Ethics, 15:2, 118-137, DOI:
10.1080/17449626.2019.1639532
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/17449626.2019.1639532
Published online: 30 Jul 2019.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 231
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
The road to the Sustainable Development Goals: building
global alliances and norms
Des Gasper
International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Hague, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Several insider accounts of the formation of the Sustainable
Development Goals suggest that the process (the procedures
used and the emergent organizational and governance system
features) was as important as the resulting goal-set. The paper
looks at both aspects, and relationships between them: the rising
influence of Southern nations (seen in the roles played by
Colombia, Brazil, some African countries and the G77); the partial
transcendence of traditional inter-bloc negotiation, including
through adoption of elements of deliberative decision-making; the
major involvement of civil society and business organizations,
thanks especially to the IT revolution; the adoption of a goals-
targets-indicators frame that has flexibility at national level and
implicit reliance on intensive further civil society activism and
monitoring. The paper considers these features and the implied
prospects for the SDGs in relation to various perspectives on
global governance, with special reference to norm-setting:
Ruggie’s concepts of ‘global public domain’ and ‘polycentric
global governance’, Risse and Sikkink’s ‘norms cascade’, Murphy’s
posited required elements for progressive global innovation, and
Raskin’s model of transition through responses to crises. It
concludes with questions for further work, including regarding the
possibly problematic absence of an explicit inspirational value-core.
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Themes and overview
The contents of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are in various respects limited
and problematic.1 However, the process through which they emerged is equally important
and carries implications for their long-run potential. Studying this process has lessons for
thinking about global ethics in practice, not only in abstracted idealized theorizing. For
example, much discussion of alliances focuses on personal links and interpersonal trust,
but for global challenges we must consider also relationships that are indirect, impersonal
and work via very large systems. Human rights discourse is good for many roles here but
has major limits too. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are a set of global aspira-
tional goals that are complementary to and sometimes more specific than human rights
and are partly focused via targets and indicators. I will discuss the formation of the
SDGs as an attempt to stimulate and coordinate progressive action and cooperation
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worldwide, and the systems of alliances that emerged to articulate, negotiate, and promul-
gate the goals. Webs of personal relations played a role, but within systems of institutio-
nalized relationships.
Current global economic development is not sustainable, but the economic growth
imperatives in capitalism, plus techno-optimism, market theology, and nationalist identi-
ties, ambitions and rivalries, mean that denial, inattention, and non-preparation prevail
(Gasper 2019). Ignorance about other people adds to and reinforces indifference, antag-
onism, and even malice towards them, hindering the cooperation and preparations
needed for a sustainable world. Crisis becomes thereby an inevitable phase before any
fundamental change.
Although necessary, crisis is insufficient; it can provoke fear, hate, and increased selfish-
ness. Various authors (e.g. Raskin 2016) identify elements necessary for an effective pro-
gressive response. Murphy (2005) suggests the following: wideranging networks must
have formed, be motivated by plausible and inspiring values and a vision of a better
future, have produced practicable ideas for action, and have established links to poten-
tially sympathetic decision-makers, so as to be ready when opportunities arise as crises
emerge and grow. In addition, the activists for change must be alert, active, realistic,
and decisive when times of crisis-cum-opportunity arrive.
We can see such elements at work in the spread of human rights ideas. In the model of
the ‘human rights cascade’, ideas were disseminated and institutionalized globally in the
late twentieth century via a ‘boomerang effect’ that reinforced local campaigns through
connection to a ‘global human rights polity’ headquartered in the North. But whereas
the ‘human rights cascade’ involved simple alliances between local human rights defen-
ders and global supporters referring to authoritative global norms on civil and political
rights, already in the case of the human rights responsibilities of international businesses
we see more complex ‘polycentric global governance’, wherein progress has required
cooperation between a greater range of actors, mechanisms and norms, and more flexi-
bility and plurality. In addition, the ‘boomerangs’ sent from the South are now not just
calls to the North for help. Instead they are often Southern proposals or models, sent glob-
ally; the North–South division has evolved and partly eroded. The SDGs process illustrates
this, and also matches Murphy’s model regarding necessary elements in change.
This paper looks at the emergence and nature of the SDGs, from the Rio+20 process of
2009–2012, through the 2012 Rio global summit on sustainable development that pro-
duced the declaration The Future We Want (United Nations 2012), to the subsequent
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations 2015), agreed in New York by
all governments in 2015, that includes the SDGs. Rio+20 and this 2030 Agenda were pro-
ducts of a growing global infrastructure of governmental, private and civil society actors,
networks, and values, that have operated to in some ways reform the global power-system
and restrain its destructive and damaging tendencies (Dodds, Laguna-Celis, and Thomp-
son 2014; Dodds, Donoghue, and Roesch 2017; Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018).
According to Macharia Kamau – the forceful Kenyan co-chair of the UN’s Open Working
Group that prepared the main SDGs proposal during 2013–2014 and of the UN General
Assembly negotiation process that very largely adopted that proposal in 2015 – more
was achieved by this process than almost anyone in 2012 had considered possible
(Kamau 2018, xviii): a comprehensive and universal policy agenda and a partly reconfi-
gured system of global governance. The work has to a large extent been led from the
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South, often by actors who have moved between government, international agencies,
NGOs, and research. While the contents of the SDGs on paper often fall short, together
the contents, process, and systems provide stepping-stones that can help in mitigating
and coping with the crises that are likely to unfold (Gasper 2019).
The paper analyses mechanisms and dynamics in the emergence of the SDGs, showing
important alliances between states and between state- and non-state actors, but within
fluid and flexible ‘cooperation regimes’ that can fit the requirements and real options
for advance in situations of polycentric modern global governance. The analysis of emer-
gence then leads to a series of questions about the SDGs’ future potential.
From human rights cascades to polycentric global governance
The SDGs build on a core of value inspiration provided by human rights ideas, but not
exclusively and largely only tacitly.2 Human rights ideas and practice illustrate, first, the
role of inspirational, value-rich, universal yet action-oriented ideas for national and
especially international mobilization and cooperation. They illustrate too, secondly, the
need for complementary policy craft and governance craft, to manage differing interpret-
ations of and conflicts amongst these values, in settings where powers of initiative in
policy and governance grow in numerous countries, movements, and corporations all
over the world. We can see these features in respectively, first, late twentieth century
‘human rights cascades’ into authoritarian states, and second, current attempts to bring
human rights to bear in guiding global businesses.
The 1970s through 1990s saw a striking strengthening of international civil and political
human rights norms in many (previously) authoritarian or semi-authoritarian countries.
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) adopted Sunstein’s (1997) term ‘norms cascade’ to describe
this process; and Risse and Sikkink (1999) presented an influential model of such ‘human
rights cascades’ (see also Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 2013). Human rights language plays
essential roles in linking diverse global constituencies (Gasper 2006, 2016). It is vivid,
morally forceful, sufficiently universally comprehensible and intuitively meaningful, and
often indicates responsibilities for specified agents. The strengths are evident when we
contrast with a sister example, the Human Development movement in development
policy analysis and statistics. While human development thinking adds some required
subtlety and flexibility, it lacks such vivid forcefulness and action-oriented specification
of rights and duties (Gasper 2007). International agreement and attention became mobi-
lized instead around the needs-based International Development Targets consolidated by
OECD in 1996, that evolved into the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Many human rights advocates have been infuriated that the SDGs do not centre on pro-
mulgation of human rights conventions and principles. But human rights’ very forceful-
ness and their lack of underlying theoretical agreement bring limits too; rights often
conflict, in the short-run or longer-term, and creativity and pragmatism are required for
handling the conflicts. Further, only asserting human rights, against the national dreams
of aspirant powers and the ambitions of national and global businesses, will frequently
fail to produce the required internalization and socialization.
John Ruggie’s ‘Framework’ (Ruggie 2008) and ‘Principles’ (OHCHR 2011) for business
corporations’ public responsibilities illustrates a more likely path forward, including mod-
alities similar to those crafted later for the SDGs. Human rights advocates have demanded
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that corporations adopt all the human rights obligations in international human rights law.
Businesses replied that they are not governments and that they produce social benefits as
a side-effect of making profits, so that they should be left to self-regulate and voluntarily
follow self-defined codes. Organized business has had the power and backing to block
anything more. In the late 1990s, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan took a step beyond
this deadlock, bringing forward a more ambitious voluntary code, the Global Compact.
Through their participation in the Compact, the increasing number of businesses who
join for the sake of respectability of their public profile, and thus to insure their business
prospects, ‘acknowledge that universal principles at least in some measure also encom-
pass the sphere of transnational corporate activity’ (Ruggie 2004, 516). In 2005 Annan
mandated Ruggie, his chief adviser for the Compact, to lead a second stage.
Ruggie decided not to aim for a perfectionist solution or a special new human rights con-
vention for businesses that would never be agreed upon or sufficiently widely ratified.
Instead, he focused on the obligation of businesses to not violate rights specified in the fore-
most existing agreements. A principle of non-violation is hard for businesses and their
backers to object to. In 2008 he presented the Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework.
Further, he indicated practical implications of the non-violation principle, and procedures
for getting case-by-case negotiated compromises between conflicting objectives, notably
in the 2011 Guiding Principles document. By getting practical, including indicating space
for crafting worthwhile compromises, and by remaining at the level of ‘soft law’ norms
rather than aiming to be binding ‘hard law’, the Principles gained a very high, unusual,
degree of support both at the intergovernmental level and from corporations.
Reflecting on these experiences, Ruggie offered a theory of polycentric global govern-
ance. He noted the co-existence of: first, public law, both national and international,
including human rights conventions; second, companies’ corporate governance; and
third, the civil governance mechanisms by which people affected by business activities
try to influence them, including ‘campaigns, law suits, and other forms of pressure, but
also partnering with companies to induce positive change’ (2015, 3). His Principles offer
a ‘basis whereby the three forms of governance systems become better aligned in relation
to business and human rights, compensate for one another’s shortcomings and begin to
play mutually reinforcing roles’ (2015, 2). Generalizing this perspective, effective poly-
centric global governance involves connecting to and linking all countries and all major
actors – states, businesses, civil society actors – and employs many channels of discourse,
contestation, and action. Citing his own earlier work (Ruggie 2004, 519), Ruggie forwards
the concept of ‘the global public domain’ which refers to
an increasingly institutionalized transnational arena of discourse, contestation and action con-
cerning the production of global public goods, involving private as well as public actors. It
does not by itself determine global governance outcomes any more than its counterpart
does at the domestic level. But it introduces opportunities for and constraints upon both
global and national governance that did not exist in the past. (2015, 3)
The SDGs emerged as a movement in the global public domain that seeks to add ideas,
opportunities, incentives, and energies, plus constraints, disciplines, and frameworks into
national and corporate governance domains. Like the Ruggie Principles they build on and
link existing agreements and fora, while leaving space for case-specific negotiation, adap-
tation, and innovation.
JOURNAL OF GLOBAL ETHICS 121
Rio+20 and the emergence of the SDGs, 2010–2015
A set of recent insider accounts tell us much about the SDGs process. Felix Dodds pub-
lished two books in collaboration with senior participants in the process. From Rio+20 to
a New Development Agenda (Dodds, Laguna-Celis, and Thompson 2014) was written
with a Mexican government representative and a former government Minister from
Barbados who became a UN Assistant Secretary General. The successor book, Negotiating
the SDGs (Dodds, Donoghue, and Roesch 2017), about the events of 2014–2015, was
written with David Donoghue, the Irish ambassador to the UN who co-facilitated the
Inter-Governmental Negotiations of 2014–2015, and Jimena Leiva-Roesch who was a Gua-
temalan diplomat at the UN. Further, Donoghue and two others – Paula Caballero of
Colombia, creator of the SDGs idea, and Olav Kjørven, the lead UNDP official for discussions
on the post-2015 agenda –wrote personal accounts of key phases (Donoghue 2016; Cabal-
lero 2016; Kjørven 2016). Lastly, the Kenyan UN Ambassador Macharia Kamau, co-chair of
both the 2013–2014 and 2014–2015 cycles of negotiation, cooperated with an American
academic and a senior ex-UN official to produce Transforming Multilateral Diplomacy: the
inside story of the sustainable development goals (2018). Drawing on these and other
accounts, we see how the process involved a rise of the influence and effectiveness of
Southern actors and at the same time a movement beyond traditional blocs.
‘The rise of the South’ …
Countries and individuals from ‘the South’ played decisive roles in establishing and steer-
ing the Rio+20 summit (the UN Conference on Sustainable Development), including insert-
ing the notion of SDGs, and in the Goals’ subsequent articulation and approval. Prominent
were the governments of Brazil and Colombia; other important players included India,
Kenya, Pakistan, South Africa and Uganda, amongst others. Prominent too were individ-
uals from all parts of the ‘South’, as government representatives or international agency
officials or civil society campaigners. We see, however, in the crafting of a detailed SDGs
specification and an agreed package, not just an insurgent ‘South’ but the importance
of transcending blocs.
Transitioning from the post-World War II order
The United Nations system was established by the victors of the Second World War,
especially the United States. We must distinguish, in the words of the UN Intellectual
History Project, three ‘United Nations’: first, the intergovernmental forum, consisting of
the General Assembly, Security Council, and other standing Councils and the comparable
entities for each of the UN special agencies; second, the international administration, in the
headquarters secretariat and the special agencies; but also third, the global publics and
worlds of organizations and resource persons who seek to inform and persuade the gov-
ernments and secretariats and to additionally represent ‘We the peoples’, the phrase used
in the UN Charter (Jolly, Emmerij, and Weiss 2009). Permanent ambiguities and tensions
have existed concerning the statuses and relations of these three spheres. Especially
the third has grown in recent decades.
The United States and to a great extent the UN’s other founding Great Powers have
viewed the intergovernmental forum as purely a consultative and support body, a
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successor to the grouping of allies and friendly neutral countries that the US had formed
under that name (‘the United Nations’) during the SecondWorld War. The post-1945 global
order ensconced an American veto and/or American predominance in international gov-
ernance systems. The US, assisted by the UK, typically determined what emerged from
global negotiations and what did not; these insider allies still for example blocked inclusion
of corporate environmental responsibility in the instruments for follow-up of the Rio 1992
Earth Summit (Dodds, Laguna-Celis, and Thompson 2014). For most of that period the G7
(the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Canada) still formed a de facto global
Cabinet. They perceived themselves as qualified and entitled to decide. Some other
countries by contrast, and many civil society organizations and others, have increasingly
wished to treat the intergovernmental forum, in full conversation with ‘the Third UN’, men-
tioned above, as the authoritative global forum, embodiment or voice of ‘We the peoples’.
Over time, tensions in this post-1945 system of global governance grew, as the number
of member countries increased, conformity within blocs declined, and members advanced
in capacities and self-confidence. In addition, the strength and involvement of non-gov-
ernment actors – business, civil society, and non-profits, all typically linked in global net-
works – grew extraordinarily, amplified by new systems of communication. The
conventional UN negotiation format, with all governments involved in word-by-word dis-
putation around a draft from the UN bureaucracy, had by the new century become vir-
tually unworkable (Kamau 2018). Kofi Annan as UN Secretary General (1996–2005) had
the skills and moral stature to still use some windows of opportunity. But the MDGs
over whose introduction he presided were largely a product of Northern donor countries,
via the OECD, the World Bank, and the UN Secretariat. They achieved centrality because
official development assistance was still decisively important for many countries; by
2012–2015 it was manifestly much less so.
The financial crisis that began in 2007–2008 reduced G7 authority and was a trigger for
several shifts. Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor (2018) describe the soaring self-belief felt by
‘emerging market’ economies, that in contrast to during their 1997–1998 financial crisis
had now accumulated huge reserves. The South would no longer accept a Northern-set
global development agenda. After the 2008 financial crisis, it was instead the North that
had to cut back. The Copenhagen COP in 2009 highlighted the collapse of the tradition
of multilateral negotiation dominated by the North. Powerful new players from the
South were determined to block such practices, as China, India, and Brazil did at Copenha-
gen. But a mass of other South players were no longer willing to accept deals cooked by
only a small insider alliance, whether old or new (Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018).
Increasingly assertive Latin American nations, often acting in concert, used opportunities
provided by chairing the General Assembly or hosting a major UN event to harness ener-
gies from all three UN worlds. Using spaces widened by Annan, they activated the General
Assembly’s coordinating role across multiple agendas and agencies and the Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC)’s role in coordinating discussions of sustainable development and
the environment (Dodds, Laguna-Celis, and Thompson 2014).
Establishing and steering Rio+20 and injecting the SDGs notion – Brazil and
Colombia
The idea for a Rio+20 global summit conference came from Brazil in 2007, with stress on an
agenda that would take ‘sustainable development’ seriously, covering both ‘people’ and
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‘planet’. It gained approval in 2009, through support from the G77 and active interest of
other groups such as ALBA (the association of Bolivarian states) and the association of
Small Island Developing States. The US government lobbied to restrict Rio+20 to a
small event, but lost control of the agenda (Dodds, Laguna-Celis, and Thompson 2014).
Key figures in preparation, management and follow-up of the 2012 conference came
from the South: the Pakistani Tariq Banuri, champion of ‘Sustainable Human Development’
in the 1990s, was director of the preparatory Secretariat; and Sha Zukang, Chinese head of
the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), authorized ongoing open
publication online of all important conference materials (Dodds, Laguna-Celis, and Thomp-
son 2014). Just as geopolitics had evolved beyond the G7, so global diplomacy at a per-
sonal level appears marked by new generations of highly educated, experienced LDC
participants, moulded in various cooperative international processes.
Vital for the commitment to SDGs at Rio+20 were two states: Brazil, the host and chair,
who provided central steering, and Colombia, who provided the unifying idea. Their
cooperation drove the train and recruited many allies and passengers. As of early 2012
preparations for the summit – negotiating through plenary sessions of 190-plus-countries
and innumerable uncoordinatable side-channels – were in trouble (Kamau, Chasek, and
O’Connor 2018). A coordinating idea-cum-vision was required, but the ‘green economy’
theme offered by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and backed by rich Northern
countries was widely resisted, seen as a plot to block Southern industrialization or as
importing economism into Human-Nature relations. The SDGs notion, tabled in 2011 by
Colombia without much impact, attracted new attention. In response to the call for sug-
gestions for the Rio+20 and post-2015 agendas, Paula Caballero, a Colombian government
official, had proposed a broadened MDG-style set of goals: for sustainable development
comprehensively conceived and, correspondingly, for the whole world:
I was concerned that the entire Conference was to focus on green economy – a concept mired
in controversy – and a new international [organizational] architecture for sustainable develop-
ment.… neither had the potential for incentivizing the deep transformations at scale so
urgently needed. (Caballero 2016, 1)
The Colombian government adopted Caballero’s proposal, but it initially received little
support. Many people felt that SDGs would lose the MDGs’ priority to developing countries
and the poor. Colombia answered that poverty goals could never be achieved and sus-
tained without attention to global boundaries and interconnections. Asked too ‘Why is
Colombia trying to lead on a global agenda?’ it replied: we are a global ‘bridge builder’
(Caballero 2016, 2). It acted accordingly; for example, Caballero and her Minister went
to Delhi in March 2012 to successfully persuade a key doubter, the Indian government.
The SDGs idea to (re-)integrate development and environment agendas gained
sufficient backing to enter the negotiating text for Rio+20. Brazil itself had wanted to
create a son-of-MDGs plus separate SDGs, but as conference chair it now adopted the pro-
posal that had gained momentum. Its forceful yet inclusive chairing of the conference bro-
kered an agreement out of the jaws of defeat (Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018). The
Brazilian chair repeatedly announced that ‘If there is no agreement then we have no
alternative’ but that ‘the chair takes the pen’ (Caballero 2016, 15). This decisive style
allowed the discussion to become focused on a single text at each stage not a forest of
competing redrafts, within a tight schedule set by the imminent arrival of heads of
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state. Formal approval was achieved for The Future We Want document (UN 2012) that,
while including much talk of ‘green economy’ and much reiteration of previous declara-
tions, culminated in a plan to create a new set of goals from 2015, now for all countries
and integrating environment and development, taking over from the MDGs.
Establishing and managing a process to specify SDGs
Vitally, the conference outcome included a decision on follow-up. After days of nego-
tiation, Brazil came down on the side of G77’s choice for an extended open negotiation
of SDGs via the General Assembly, not only prior drafting within the UN bureaucracy or
by a special commission of ‘the great and the good’, and steered this through to adoption,
despite strong resistance in many corners (Caballero 2016; Kjørven 2016). The eventual
report of the separate great-and-good High Level Panel of Eminent Persons of 2012–
2013 fortunately then recommended a variant of the SDGs idea, but was not used as
the authoritative basis for their elaboration. Instead, that role was acquired by the Open
Working Group (OWG) appointed by the General Assembly that began work well before
the High Level Panel reported. As Northern powers and the UN Secretariat gradually
came to realize, the SDGs initiative had been irreversibly taken over by the General Assem-
bly. Article 81 of The Future We Want meant what it said: ‘We further reaffirm the central
position of the General Assembly as the chief deliberative, policymaking and representa-
tive organ of the United Nations.’ ‘We’ here meant the majority of the member-states,
operating with the principle that ‘Responsible sovereignty is… a necessary condition
for States to cooperate in creating the conditions for the realization of internationally
recognized rights and freedoms’ (CDP 2014, 58). States will accept responsibilities if
their sovereign right to interpret them is respected.
During 2012–2015 it became clear, step by step, that the SDGs as formulated by the
OWG would be the main part of the post-2015 agenda, not a parallel or competitor exer-
cise (Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018, 212). The OWG proceeded at majestic and delib-
erate speed, spending all of 2013 on detailed public stocktaking, followed by negotiation
of an SDGs draft in the first half of 2014; building such a degree of consensus and momen-
tum that rich countries that had hoped to renegotiate during the next stage found them-
selves isolated (Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018, 213). The OWG report (United Nations
2014b) was adopted by the General Assembly as the main basis, not just one input, for the
inclusion of SDGs as centrepiece of the post-2015 agenda. The marriage of two huge
policy trains, both with many long ensconced occupants – the Rio sustainable develop-
ment agenda, now led by the General Assembly and G77, and the fuller post-MDGs
(‘post-2015’) agenda, coordinated by the UN Secretariat – was successfully finessed
(Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018, 99ff).
A major Southern presence continued within the OWG. African nations had mobilized
successfully to obtain an African co-facilitator; and Kenya moved to profile itself through
this position (Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018, 59–61). Southern-origin resource
persons were much used in the stocktaking sessions throughout 2013, and made an
impact (80-1). Colombia remained very active during the unusually long, intense, and
open deliberations, as part of a coalition including many European partners (e.g. the tra-
ditional Nordic progressives, Switzerland, and Hungary, which provided the second of the
two co-facilitators), and, for example, Indonesia, Kenya, and Pakistan (Kjørven 2016, 9).
Similarly, in the subsequent process during 2014–2015 to get an agreement in the full
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General Assembly, actors from the South and from outside the traditional big players had
vital roles. Ambassador Kamau was reappointed co-facilitator; Uganda headed the General
Assembly for 2014–2015; and South Africa headed the G77 for 2015 (Kamau, Chasek, and
O’Connor 2018). Their closeness helped in surviving a series of challenges, notably from
many developed countries eager to reopen issues concluded on by the OWG. The G77-
plus-China very largely refused this, fearing that the whole elaborate compromise could
then explode.
So far we have sketched a ‘rise of the South’ expressed in the SDGs agenda; something
significant in terms of political psychology and for wider credibility of the agenda. Next we
argue that this was not primarily a bloc-chauvinism, but part of moves towards a some-
what less divided, more open world. The SDGs process relied on a loosening of blocs,
not only a rise of countries in the South.
… and breaking open the blocs; to consolidate the emergent global public
domain
The SDGs needed to be seen as a shared global agenda, a consensus of the General
Assembly not a Southern power-grab. To generate sufficient support and commitment
for the conception, several procedural innovations contributed. The Open Working
Group was a divergence from the UN tradition of assemblies of nearly 200 countries,
usually bunched into blocs (often the US and its closest allies; the EU; the G77-plus-
China; oil-producers; and various others), deliberating and frequently failing to agree on
draft texts emergent from the UN bureaucracy. Here instead a working group from only
30 countries was asked to do the work but to be open in its discussions and open to rep-
resentations. Following Rio+20, months of negotiation established that the 30 would be
drawn roughly equally from the UN’s five regional groups (with slightly more for Africa
and Asia) but failed to bring agreement on which countries. Farrukh Khan, a Pakistan del-
egate in New York, devised a solution: two to four countries could form a joint delegation
and share a seat (Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018, 53). Such groups were known as
‘troikas’ since many contained three countries. As a result 70 countries directly
participated.
Compared to having 193 countries seeking to be heard and thereby frequently operat-
ing via the traditional rigid blocs mentioned above, the thirty ‘troikas’ system had interest-
ing implications, especially since they continued for almost a year and a half and left a
legacy. First, the old blocs such as the G77 and EU were downgraded; second, there
were now nineteen voices largely from the South, out of thirty, rather than just one
G77 position; third, many troikas combined EU and non-EU countries and/or countries
of radically different income levels, which promoted mutual listening and learning, and
formation of some longer-term partnerships (Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018); and
fourth, the delegates in New York regained a negotiating role, rather than being
reduced by modern communications to mere mouthpieces of their national capitals
(Dodds, Donoghue, and Roesch 2017).
Managing this complex multilateral negotiation were two ‘co-facilitators’, de facto co-
chairs who learnt how to use the new room for manoeuvre. They were chosen from
countries (Kenya, Hungary) unthreatening to others yet with substantial capacity. They
made sure that they kept the confidence of their ‘own’ original North/South macro-bloc
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but that they represented not only that bloc and were seen to show sensitivity to the con-
cerns and political pressures in each major country and group, to work in close coordi-
nation with each other, and to stand for the integrity and effectiveness of the process
and the interests of ‘people and planet’ (Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018).
Let us consider further themodus operandi used in the OWG to try to construct a global
alliance for SDGs: open public communications; ‘parallel thinking’ to work towards a
sufficiently shared vision; and leaders who consulted exhaustively but ‘kept the pen’.
Mechanisms and dynamics in building a new global agenda
‘We will do business differently… ’ (Kamau 2016).
Open communications across and with the world
By 2011–2012 it was evident, except to some old elites recollects Kjørven (2016, 3), that
one could not repeat the MDGs procedure wherein a small group specified a global
agenda behind closed doors. The rise of the South, of civil society organizations and net-
works, and of electronic options for global deliberation, plus the West’s financial crisis, had
rendered such procedure obsolete. From the start, Colombia involved and cooperated
with major NGOs to strengthen its SDG campaign (Caballero 2016). Already in November
2011 a consultation in Bogotá involved a variety of governments and non-government
actors and initiated an SDGs alliance. Without such links, the SDGs would have been
seen as a Colombian or at most a Latin American bid for attention. A larger meeting in
early 2012, supported by the World Resources Institute, carried the campaign into the
pre-Rio+20 negotiations at the UN. All eighty participants sat around one table, which
‘created a sense of purpose and openness’ (Caballero 2016, 8).
The vision of open communication was maintained. Dodds, Laguna-Celis, and Thomp-
son (2014) report that the Stakeholder Forum served as an effective one-stop website for
all non-government stakeholders in the Rio+20 preparatory process. For the post-Rio
stage, the Open Working Group’s terms of reference made a commitment to ‘openness,
transparency, inclusiveness, and consensus’ (Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018, 56).
Ambassador Donoghue refers to
the remarkable process of global public consultation, conducted over the couple of years
[2012–14] prior to the [2014–15 inter-governmental negotiations]. This process was unprece-
dented in its scale and breadth. It gave negotiators from all member States a vivid sense of the
importance of these negotiations and the responsibilities and expectations attached to them.
It also brought out very clearly the consensus around the world that the new goals and targets
should reflect a high degree of ambition and should be truly transformational, representing a
clear step-change. (Donoghue 2016, 4)
To Kjørven’s surprise, the WorldWeWant2015 portal produced not Babel but clear pat-
terns, including emphases on elements of the 2000 Millennium Declaration that the MDGs
had omitted, ‘especially freedom from violence and fear, and responsible governance’
(2016, 7).
During the OWG negotiations, only accredited non-government stakeholders could
participate, and could only observe sessions. However, the co-chairs consulted them.
They convened regular open meetings with the non-government Major groups (the
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stakeholder fora recognized by the UN that have consultation rights). Almost no govern-
ment delegates joined, but the materials were put on the website and the co-chairs found
many of the ideas helpful. They recognized too that for later action the commitment of
civil society would be vital (Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018, 125 ff.).
The OWG sessions were webcast; and their stately pace over a year and a half encour-
aged continuing work in a maze of arenas of consultation and lobbying – per theme,
within countries, via stakeholder groupings, and more (summarized by Dodds, Donoghue,
and Roesch 2017, 56). Informal discussion arenas in this case built trust and crossed
borders; e.g. for each thematic area a ‘Friends of… ’ group existed in UN circuits, and
the World Resources Institute organized many confidential fora.
The subsequent stage of intergovernmental negotiations through the General
Assembly from November 2014 to July 2015 involved many new people, but much of
the OWG’s openness, post-blocs spirit, and flexibility is reported to have continued.
The co-facilitators were granted coordinating authority; the post-2015 Agenda was
acknowledged as so important that individual countries could speak, not only
through blocs (Donoghue 2016, 2); and the unusual degree of mingling of government
delegations and intergovernmental agencies with non-government stakeholders even
intensified: member-state representatives began to mix with civil society in the
additional informal consultation sessions (Donoghue 2016, 5; Kamau, Chasek, and
O’Connor 2018, 222–223). According to Donoghue, strong civil society involvement
kept the level of ambition and technical quality high (2016, 7). By the final negotiation
days in July 2015, the participation of the non-government Major stakeholder groups
ran so easily that there was no G77 request to remove them from the hall, unlike in pre-
vious large UN negotiations (Dodds, Donoghue, and Roesch 2017). Two years of inter-
action had increased mutual acceptance and respect, plus the non-government
actors felt no need to exert last-minute pressure, for they had enjoyed ample space
to participate (Donoghue 2016).
Parallel thinking – the white hat: building sufficient shared global vision
The OWG co-chairs rejected the usual UN procedure of inter-bloc debate ad nauseam of
competing draft texts. Instead, to the astonishment of many, they allocated almost a
year to ‘stocktaking’: a process of consciousness-raising, trust-building, and upgrading
the knowledge base of perhaps most delegations, starting from less controversial topics
(Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018, 71ff). One sees an analogy to James Fishkin’s
system of ‘deliberative polling’ – moving to debate and decisionmaking only after a
long dispassionate briefing-and-questioning phase (Fishkin 2011) – and Edward De
Bono’s ‘Six Hats’ approach (1994, 2000), which requires a demarcated ‘White Hat’ phase
of cooperative information-gathering and sifting. Eight multi-day meetings were held in
New York through 2013 and the start of 2014, over a total of 29 days. This format encour-
aged continuity of participation by New York-based national teams, while giving them
time to liaise back home and learn too from the numerous inter-sessional events, often
organized through the President of the General Assembly. The stocktaking sessions estab-
lished a frame of taking responsibility for global problems, and a feeling that countries
would themselves determine the direction, not be dictated to by closed expert groups
or specialist agencies (Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018, 75–76). According to
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Kjørven, the OWG became ‘open and deliberative’ (2016, 9), not a standard arena for
reading-out statements and criticizing others but a group for shared thinking and learning.
The long preparatory phase created a sufficient common awareness of the magni-
tude and seriousness of what was being addressed and the advances that could be
made through feasible responses; it established a de facto working global alliance,
not just partisan alliances. So in final negotiations on the OWG’s report, faced with
the choice between using a veto on one’s favourite topic where one had not got all
that one wanted or instead accepting an overall worthwhile package-deal, every
country chose the latter (Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018, 155–160). For example,
in classic UN style, the night before the final session ‘a powerful country’ brought
new demands. It was told by Kamau and the head of the UNDESA secretariat that
this was too late but that it was free to make its demands in open session during
the final meeting; it did not. A similar last moment insurrection arose from countries
objecting to language on sexual and reproductive rights. They were reminded that
all SDGs remain subject to a country’s choices during implementation, but that they
had the option to veto the text publicly and be judged by the rest of the world. The
insurrection fizzled out.
The blue hat: understanding and managing the cast of characters and ‘keeping
the pen’
Important in the 2013–2015 negotiations were bilateral South–North alliances, including
between the co-chairs (Kenya-Hungary, later Kenya-Ireland) and the connections that
these facilitators maintained with diverse other players and alliances, so that they could
judge what compromises would be plausible. Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor (2018,
107–119) distinguish a series of country groups in the OWG: those in sympathy with
the SDGs concept and spirit, such as Colombia, France, Germany, Guatemala; ‘the Conser-
vatives’, such as Brazil, China, and India, preoccupied with enforcing greater responsibil-
ities for richer countries and ensuring their own right to pollute first and clean up later,
as the rich had done; ‘the Ultra-conservatives’, like Saudi Arabia; and particular issue-
coalitions, like the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) whose emphasis on Mother Earth was
taken into account and respected.
To maintain a focus on big issues during the final five multi-day OWG sessions, reserved
for formal negotiations, and to avoid the traditional descent into word-by-word warfare,
the co-facilitators retained for themselves and their secretariat the prerogative of drafting
and re-drafting (‘Holding the pen’; Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018, 146ff.). They pro-
vided frequently updated drafts that aimed to demonstrably reflect the balance of the
open-access discussions. This avoided public contestation between jealously defended
amendments from specific delegations, the normal practice. The co-chairs refused all
requests to switch to on-screen negotiation of text, the traditional format. The refusal
was politically sustainable only through their being constantly available and interactive
and retaining the trust of delegations and governments. By circulating a 182-page compi-
lation of all proposed amendments they showed delegates that suggestions were recog-
nized, but also the absurdity of switching to such a document as the focus for negotiation.
In De Bono’s terms, the co-chairs wore the ‘Blue Hat’, determining the sequence and sche-
dule of topics of discussion while ensuring that each stage involved the participants
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working ‘in parallel’: focused on the topics and not on each other, with no sub-group ‘own-
ership’ of competing draft texts. They declined to delegate negotiation of particular
difficult issues to assigned sub-groups or mini-alliances, for that would jeopardize
broadly-shared commitment, overall intellectual coherence, and the chairs’ ability to
suggest cross-issue deals.
In this way, the extraordinary number of issues under discussion could be managed.
Indeed the sheer number gave more scope for making deals, provided that the chairper-
sons retained authority and trust, and provided they and their team had listened enough
to identify both the no-go zones and possibilities for compromise. Kamau, Chasek, and
O’Connor (2018) supply numerous examples from the 2014 climax of OWG negotiations.
They found too that having an extensive Introduction section (‘chapeau’), that presented
preamble, context, and broad approach prior to the goal-by-goal texts, provided a useful
‘protective belt’ where many points dear to particular participants but disputed by
others could be placed (for example, the principle of Common But Differentiated
Responsibility).
While the negotiations during 2015 to write the post-2015 agenda document were in
some ways more openly and traditionally political (Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018,
217 ff.), they retained several features of the OWG. Crucially, the two co-facilitators ‘kept
the pen’. They could thus more readily find late-stage compromises; draft an inspirational
if non-binding introductory Declaration that presented the themes of People, Planet, Pros-
perity, Peace, and Partnerships; and traverse the swampy territory of principles of account-
ability by adopting G77’s language of voluntary, nation-state centred but still open and
participatory ‘reporting and review’ that would retain weight through requiring presen-
tation of the reviews to periodic High Level Political Fora of the UN. Remarkably, the nego-
tiation process was concluded on time, several weeks before the heads-of-states summit
that confirmed approval.
Communication again
The next stage in building alliances began immediately: to communicate the SDGs to
publics and organizations worldwide (Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018, ch. 9). The
SDGs were produced by far fuller consultative processes than for the MDGs, and
were led by national governments not international bureaucracies, so they were
launched with already a fuller awareness from insider stakeholders; but reaching
wider publics requires more. The now familiar visual icons were devised by
filmmaker Richard Curtis and a Swedish company. Some Voluntary National Reviews
have already been prepared or are underway, to be sent to the annual High Level Pol-
itical Fora on Sustainable Development. Various NGOs are preparing SDG progress
reports. Compared to the MDGs, more businesses hope for profit by linking to SDG
language and/or agendas (say, for reducing food waste), and in having their SDG-con-
tributions monitored and publicized.
One factor should be added to the accounts of the SDGs process. Having sufficient time,
including thanks to the happy coincidence that three years remained between the Rio
anniversary in 2012 and the expiry of the MDGs period in 2015, proved vital for the pro-
cesses of learning, trustbuilding and negotiating. Time alone would have been useless
though without the sorts of methods and mechanisms mentioned above.
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What is the potential of the SDGs?
What are the content qualities and potentials of the SDGs generated by these processes?
Many authors point out weaknesses, especially in the targets and indicators (e.g. Fukuda-
Parr and McNeill 2019). However, part of the potential of the SDGs derives from their form
– as norms that have a public education role, articulated in a goals-targets-indicators fra-
mework with scope for national level adjustments and additions – and from ongoing
investments in building systems for cooperation.
Paper tigers? Shortcomings in contents
Within technocratic and Northern establishment policy communities, the SDGs have been
frequently dismissed as a rhetorical Babel; surfeit of goals and targets meant no real goals
and targets. Browne (2017) declares this, for example; yet he also attacks the SDGs for
neglecting migration, capital flight, terrorism, conflict, democracy, and so on. Caballero
and Kjørven, in contrast, argue that to have more goals than the MDGs’ eight was vital
for achieving broad appeal; and the fact that only seventeen emerged, compared to
the ocean of proposals, was remarkable.
For many commentators, the gallery of worthy goals is vitiated by fundamental omis-
sions. First, non-recognition of planetary boundaries. Brandi (2015) sees cognizance of only
two of six such ‘guard rails’; Camacho (2015) notes silence on population growth; and
Palmer (2015a) and Browne (2017) criticize the adherence to a ‘three pillars’ notion of sus-
tainable development that retains as a first pillar an unreconceptualized economic growth.
There is no commitment to replace the disastrous use of GDP as a measure of progress
(Stewart 2015). Instead the 2030 Agenda, like 2012’s The Future We Want, constantly reiter-
ates ‘economic growth’ – for all countries, even the already super-affluent, to continue
without end. Second, the SDGs do not seriously address problems in rich countries (e.g.
what do poverty and malnutrition distinctively mean in these countries); nor, third, do
they seriously address inequality, a key driver of problems in all fields (Vandemoortele
2017). Fourth, the set lacks an explicit, motivating, disciplining ethical basis.3 Fifth, no
clear responsibilities are assigned, especially to those who are responsible for the
current state of global systems (Pogge and Sengupta 2015) and who have response-
ability (Fukuda-Parr and McNeill 2015).
Arguably, these commentators miss some dimensions central to polycentric global gov-
ernance. The goals-targets-indicators framework can contribute in capturing and focusing
attention and energies, and in encouraging commitments cascades; but it is not intended
to provide a globally enforced blueprint (Kamau 2017). Stewart (2015) fears that the goals
are too universally generalized; but their status is as advisory, and national responsibility
allows the nation-specific refocusing she calls for. To combine mobilization and intelligent
flexibility will partly depend on the quantity and quality of responses by national and
global civil society. Further, processes of impact will not occur in one smooth stage, for
they unfold in interaction with often-problematic established power-structures. As in
the human rights cascade model, change will happen in phases, punctuated by crises.
The role of the SDGs as a normic framework is not only to guide phases of relatively
straightforward gains but also to help mobilize forces for change, that, given suitable prep-
aration, can respond effectively during the crises.
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Progress through goals-targets-indicators (G-T-I) and nation-specific
adaptations
The rationale of a G-T-I framework is political as well as technical. Whereas the 1992 Rio
conference’s Agenda 21 rapidly lost impetus (Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018), the
goals-and-targets format of the MDGs a decade later helped make them memorable
and actionable (Pronk 2015), allowing the UN to capture attention, focus discussion,
and regain a coordinator role. Kjørven recounts how he like many others originally had
no time for the simplistic-seeming MDGs, but found in practice that they had a valuable
coordinating function (2016, 2). The focused, shared attention was not only from develop-
ment managers and aid officials but from politicians and publics. Browne notes thus that
while MDG contents were nothing special or new, their presentation and targetization
contributed to heightened public support in the North for development assistance, and
to the 2002 Monterrey commitment to provide more financial support for the specified
ends – unusual in that it was so substantially fulfilled (2017, 98).
Reflecting that the MDGs were donor-tools, they had much less public profile in the
South. In contrast, the SDGs have been prepared with more consultation and launched
more rapidly and widely, propelled by the now ubiquitous icons and by framing in ‘a
“we the people[s]” document, rather than using only a state-centric approach. [Their]
achievement will [depend on] their ability to inspire people around the world’ (Dodds,
Donoghue, and Roesch 2017, 128). Palmer’s concerns that the end of the OWG marked
the end of global consultation seem misplaced – the genie is out of the bottle (2015b).
The G-T-I framework is meant to allow a combination of big vision, feasible foci, and
nationally-specific adaptations. Vandemoortele (2017) warns that only 30 of the 169
SDG ‘targets’ as formulated in 2015 were clear, time-specific, and quantified; Browne
(2017) and others correspondingly condemn the goals as not a helpful management
tool. Arguably however, the SDGs are not to be judged by technocratic tidiness, as if
they were MDGs 2.0 for coordinating the work of a set of controller international
funding agencies. Instead, in a different historical era compared to at the turn of the mil-
lennium, the criterion is how far they can inspire efforts and creativity from innumerable
diverse agents worldwide.
To inspire and mobilize, national-level character and flexibility are important. During
the MDGs this was ignored by donors, records Vandemoortele; for example Vietnam
and Cambodia produced their own MDGs sets which foreign funders bypassed. But the
SDGs are not a donor-centred exercise; they must play a mobilizing role within national
societies, not only for international funding agencies, and this requires meaningful nation-
ally-specific targets and indicators. In early 2015, principles of national ownership and
intra-national disaggregation were agreed for the indicators framework (Dodds, Dono-
ghue, and Roesch 2017, 123ff.). This came at member-state insistence and on advice
from the UN’s expert Committee on Development Policy, to acknowledge ‘the diversity
of national circumstances and policy approaches – a diversity which should be embedded
in the architecture of global governance as an intrinsic feature of the global community,
not as an exception to general rules’ (UN 2014a, vii).
More can be said about shortcomings of the existing global list of indicators, but if
nationally-led processes are central these indicators are not the heart of the matter
(Kamau 2017). A non-binding flexible framework may be more productive in situations
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where the actors whom one seeks to influence are not cowed mistrusted dependents but
instead resourceful and wilful agents (Biermann, Kanie, and Ekima 2017). National-level
flexibility need not mean dilution of targets and indicators if civil society is well mobilized.
In such situations seeking to disseminate inspiring norms that indicate directions, rather
than to impose standard world targets, can be sensible.
Norm diffusion and corporate commitments cascades
Browne suggests that the UN development system has had four roles. First, to provide
research, data, and information; second, to undertake projects and provide technical assist-
ance. In these areas, the UN is now a small actor compared to others, but it remains central
and indispensable in the two other roles: third, development of norms and technical stan-
dards, and associated monitoring; and fourth, preparation of global policy and conven-
tions, and related awareness-raising. He plausibly proposes that the SDGs are best seen
as a norm-setting agenda (2017, 143–144), which fits ‘the world ‘beyond aid’ (138), and
should be conceived in a bottom-up, human development format more than a top-
down technical sector-oriented format. Ruggie had similarly pointed out that given ‘the
emergence of a global public domain beyond the sphere of states’ (2004, 509), in which
social movements, local governments, NGOs and companies participate, norms such as
human rights and SDGs are vitally important. This holds true both when the actors involved
genuinely internalize them or only adopt them to maintain public respectability.
Norms can influence behaviour through communicating values and setting criteria for
international and intra-national comparison, legitimacy, and respectability; while yet being
compatible with different underlying value-theories and allowing flexibility in interpret-
ation and choice of means. Correspondingly, well-designed international norm sets can
sometimes call forth greater response than do more precise and purportedly universal
binding rules or a system of pure national-level self-determination. This may apply still
more strongly in seeking to influence businesses. Dodds, Laguna-Celis, and Thompson
(2014) highlights, for example, the Registry of Voluntary Commitments initiated after
the Rio+20 Corporate Sustainability Forum and the Dialogue Days with Major Groups
and other stakeholders. Seeking legitimacy and favourable publicity, a mega-corporation
like Microsoft declared there that it would go carbon-neutral. A set of 37 financial sector
CEOs agreed to a Natural Capital Declaration, to gradually implement natural capital
impact disclosure, respect for biological diversity, and so on. Such a declaration provides
a basis for subsequent monitoring and lobbying of those corporations by a Corporate Sus-
tainability Reporting Coalition.
Building systems, not only ‘alliances’
A successful global system of norm generation, diffusion, adaptation, application and
extension cannot exist in the abstract, but must be embodied in organizational and insti-
tutional systems. Most observer NGOs and radical journalists were disappointed by the
outcomes of the Rio 2012 Summit – its lauding of economic growth, its lack of decisive
binding commitments, its inevitable political vagueness and compromises. But, claim
Dodds, Laguna-Celis, and Thompson (2014), Rio+20 reflected and contributed to funda-
mental shifts in ‘architecture’: a move away from dominance by Northern governments;
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an enormous increase in business and especially global civil society involvement, linked to
the explosion in global ‘connectivity’; and a reinvigoration of parts of the UN system, ren-
dering it more capable to support follow-up than after the 1992 Rio Earth Summit or the
Millennium Declaration of 2000. For much of the 1992 Agenda little follow-up happened,
partly due to UN fragmentation. An important change made around 2012 was the abol-
ition of the ineffective Commission on Sustainable Development and the revival instead
of ECOSOC as a key UN organ, for integration across the supposed three sustainable devel-
opment pillars (economic, social, environmental), backed up by periodic High Level Politi-
cal Fora. A second significant change was reform and revival of UNEP, to establish it with
universal membership, a broader mandate and more senior permanent national
delegations.
Equally important as intergovernmental systems are global civil society systems, to
place pressure on the governmental and intergovernmental structures. This applies
strongly in the current era as neglected issues surface and interact: critical environmental
problems, the backwashes from marginalization of many groups and countries, and the
rise of populist nationalism worldwide. Systems are needed too to keep societal stake-
holder involvement itself honest and accountable. Dodds, Laguna-Celis, and Thompson
(2014) and Dodds, Donoghue, and Roesch (2017) suggest relevant elements: methods
for promoting popular participation in UN dialogues (UNDESA 2013); withdrawal of recog-
nition from ‘greenwashing’ activities, and creation of an ISO standard for what are genuine
multi-stakeholder partnerships; invigoration of National Councils for Sustainable Develop-
ment, including to inform and energize parliamentary committees; and consultation
arrangements that include young people.
Conclusion – lessons and questions
Important features of the Sustainable Development Goals include the following:
(1) The SDGs reflect ‘the rise of the South’. Both the process and the outcomes have been
strongly marked by views from the South, and so, for example, include stresses on
national sovereignty and national-level flexibility. They form an attempt at relatively
light but consensual coordination across a global system that is now less run from a
global core.
(2) At the same time, the SDGs reflect in some ways a blurring of old North–South div-
isions. Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor (2018) note a gradual evolution of the G77
beyond a focus upon obtaining concessions from the North. The SDGs emerged
through a loosening of traditional blocs, not creating or reinforcing permanent parti-
san ‘alliances’ but through an informal working alliance for ‘a world united’. Alliance
appears here as an attitude not a closed partisan bloc. Such global alliance relies on
some degrees of ambiguity.
(3) Besides the ‘proliferating transnational ties and strategies among states themselves’
(Ruggie 2004, 521), the strategies and ties among non-government actors and
between states and these actors have become markedly more important, absolutely
and relatively, as dimensions in polycentric global governance.
(4) Most of Murphy’s (2005) list of elements required in progressive international reform
were amply illustrated: wideranging networks, motivated by some unifying value-
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laden ideas embodied in practicable plans for action, and with good links to poten-
tially sympathetic decision-makers. These bases for action still require skills in
action; insider accounts of the SDG process stress the role of careful combinations
of open deliberation, forceful cohesive chairing, and building not just ‘alliances’ but
intra- and inter-organizational systems.
(5) Even when there are differences in underlying values, norms can sometimes be agreed
to and can diffuse and exert influence. A goals-targets-indicators framework can help
to catch and focus attention, including from national and global civil society; while
national sovereignty allows country-specific adjustment, prioritization, and augmenta-
tion. Commitments may in some cases cascade; for example, from corporations
hoping to build an advantageous profile and from governments or blocs that seek
global leadership or inward investments. Monitoring this set of expectations and
the actual outcomes forms a major research task ahead.
Additional questions arise for future work.
(6) What is the SDGs’ ability to inspire people around the world? Can it grow over time as
happened with human rights? Can they grow into a focus for mobilization concomi-
tant with the scale and causations of the problems considered?
(7) SDGs are less of a Northern driven and controlled process than were MDGs. But will the
South play equally important roles in the conversion of SDG themes and commitments
into action?
(8) Of special interest for global ethics theory, how far does progress require a coordinat-
ing idea-cum-vision and how far does that require an explicit ethical base? Does one
need to persuade privileged people that disadvantaging and sacrificing the poor,
including mainly poor people in other countries, is not only imprudent but wrong?
(Even more so in regard to sacrificing future generations, where pure prudence argu-
ments cannot apply.) How far has the SDGs process relied on permeation and use of a
shared global ethical Esperanto, perhaps a tacit mix of human rights and human needs
thinking, or has it only involved conceiving ‘win-win’ deals, albeit with some enlighten-
ing of the perceptions of self-interest thanks to stakeholders gradually becoming more
aware of interconnectedness, including of others’ powers both to react and to
cooperate?
There might be too little time left for much global value convergence before future
global crises; hence instead a need to rely on whatever degrees of ethical Esperanto
already exist, and on the sort of ‘Getting to Yes’ search for ‘win-wins’ that the SDGs nego-
tiations partly illustrate. The literature on policy-related research suggests that perhaps
most influence occurs via indirect channels over long time periods, including through
re-framing and re-interpretation of questions and categories, rethinking what one’s ‘inter-
ests’ are and even one’s identity. No centuries of grace time remain, however, for us to be
able to avert collapses of eco-systems through relying only on gradual social learning and
a smooth trajectory of ‘socialization’. Instead we should prepare for a series of crises and
their knock-on effects, which could open windows for bigger socio-political shifts and
fuller reconstruction of identities and values (Raskin 2016). The SDGs reflect a necessary
early phase in that unfolding pathway of transition.
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Notes
1. See e.g. two special sections in the Journal of Global Ethics, 2015.
2. The 2030 Agenda contains several mentions of human rights in its Preamble and Introduction,
but almost none in the presentation of the 17 SDGs. Donoghue (2016) notes that, even so,
objections by some governments to human rights references continued through to the
final morning of the 2015 negotiations. The other accounts of SDGs’ emergence drawn on
in this paper lack significant references to human rights.
3. A human security framework could serve to bring in such missing elements and integrate the
various components, argue Köhler et al. (2012).
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